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Abstract—Consider the resilience of a network defined by the
average 2-terminal reliability (A2TR) against a set of critical node
failures. Consider an existing transparent optical network with
a total fibre length L. The first goal of this paper is to assess the
resiliency gap between the existing topology and a new network
topology designed to maximize its resilience with the same fibre
budget L. The resiliency gap gives us a measure of how good
the resilience of existing network topologies are. Consider now
that an existing network is upgraded with new links aiming to
maximize its resiliency improvement with a fibre budget L′. The
second goal of this paper is to assess how much the resiliency
gap can be reduced between a good upgraded solution and a
network topology designed to maximize its resiliency with the
same fibre budget L+L′. The gap reduction gives us a measure
of how close to the best resilience the upgraded solutions can get
for different values of L′.
To reach these goals, we first describe how the Critical Node
Detection problem is defined and solved in the context of trans-
parent optical networks. Then, we propose a multi-start greedy
randomized method to generate network topologies, with a given
fibre length budget, that are resilient to critical node failures. This
method is also adapted to the upgrade of an existing network
topology. At the end, we run the proposed methods on network
topologies with public available information. The computational
results show that the resiliency gap of existing topologies is
significantly large but network upgrades with L′ = 10%L
can significantly reduce the resiliency gaps provided that such
upgrades are aimed at maximizing the network resilience to
multiple node failures.
Index Terms—Transparent Optical Networks; Critical Node
Detection; Resilient Network Design; Disasters
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale failures can seriously disrupt any telecommuni-
cations network due to either natural, technological or ma-
licious human activities [1] (two surveys conducted within
COST Action RECODIS are [2] on strategies to protect
networks against large-scale natural disasters and [3] on secu-
rity challenges in communication networks). So, an emerging
research topic is the design of telecommunication networks
enhancing their resilience to large-scale failures. To reach this
goal, we must first adopt a proper resiliency evaluation metric
and, then, we must investigate proper network design methods
aiming to maximize the network resiliency metric to large-
scale failures.
This work addresses the design of resilient network topolo-
gies in the context of transparent optical networks. Note that,
in general, multiple failures might involve only links or nodes
and links (a node failure implies that its links also fail). For
example, in malicious human attacks, node shutdowns are
harder to realize but are the most rewarding in the attackers
perspective (the shutdown of a single node is also able to
shut down multiple links). Node failures are more harmful to
the resilience of networks and, so, we address the topology
design of transparent optical networks which must be resilient
to multiple node failures.
For a given topology, if some nodes are considered critical
due to some reason, the network design should take this into
consideration, as in [4] where the approach proposed in [5] is
adapted to the design of a transparent optical network minimiz-
ing the failure impact of a given set of critical nodes. Here,
we consider the resiliency metric defined by the average 2-
terminal reliability (A2TR) and, for a given network topology,
we evaluate this metric against a set of critical node failures.
A2TR is defined as the number of node pairs that remain
connected if all critical nodes fail and the set of critical nodes
is the optimal solution of a Critical Node Detection (CND)
optimization problem.
CND problems have been considered in different contexts
and are gaining special attention in the vulnerability evaluation
of telecommunication networks to large-scale failures [2]. In
[6], CND is defined as the detection of a given number c of
critical nodes aiming to minimize the number of connected
node pairs. More recently, this and other variants of CND
have also been addressed [7]– [10] but none of these works
addresses the CND problem in the context of transparent
optical networks.
In these networks, data is converted into htwaveht in the
source node and transmitted through an all optical path, named
lightpath, towards the destination node. Due to many optical
degradation factors, like attenuation, dispersion, crosstalk and
other non-linear factors, there is a maximum length, named
transparent reach, for each lightpath to work properly. More-
over, the length of a path depends both on the length of its links
and on its number of hops. The optical degradation suffered
by a lightpath while traversing an intermediate node is usually
modelled by a given fibre length value d, i.e., by considering it
equivalent to the degradation incurred due to the transmission
over a given fibre of length d. So, when accounting the A2TR
metric, the CND problem has to consider that two nodes
are connected only if the surviving network provides it with
a shortest path within the transparent reach. Here, a proper
Integer Linear Programming (ILP) description of this CND
problem variant is provided together with a row generation
approach to compute its optimal solution.
Other metrics have been used to evaluate the vulnerability of
networks in other contexts [11] or assuming multiple failures
with geographical correlation between failing elements [12].
There are also works on improving the preparedness of net-
works to multiple failures, some by changing the network
topology [13], [14], [15], while others by proposing strategies
to recover from failures [16], [17]. None of these works,
though, uses the optimal solution of CND to assess the
vulnerability of networks. On the other hand, in [18], CND
is used but resiliency improvement is exploited by optimal
robust node selection on a given topology. The advantage of
using CND is that it provides a worst case resiliency analysis,
i.e., in any failure involving the same number of failing nodes,
the resulting A2TR is never worse than the value provided by
the solution of CND.
Here, we propose a multi-start greedy randomized method to
generate network topologies, with a given fibre length budget,
that are resilient to critical node failures. The method is also
adapted to the upgrade of an existing topology. For an existing
network with a total fibre length L, the first aim is to assess
the resiliency gap between the existing topology and a new
network topology designed to maximize its resilience with the
same fibre budget L. If the existing network is to be upgraded
with new links within a fibre budget L′, the second aim is to
assess how much the resiliency gap can be reduced between
a good upgraded topology and a network topology designed
to maximize its resiliency with the same fibre budget L+L′.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
a path-based Mixed ILP (MILP) model defining the CND
problem, a row generation approach used to solve it and cen-
trality based heuristics combined with a local search method
to approximate it. Section III proposes the multi-start greedy
randomized method to generate network topologies resilient to
critical node failures. The computational results are presented
and discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V presents the
main conclusions of this work.
II. CRITICAL NODE DETECTION (CND) PROBLEM
Consider a transparent optical network represented by an
undirected graph G = (N,E) where N = {1, ..., n} is the set
of nodes and E ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ N×N : i < j} is the set of
fibre links. For each link (i, j) ∈ E, parameter lij represents
its length.
The transparent reach of the network is denoted by param-
eter T > 0 and the fibre length equivalent to the degradation
suffered by a lightpath while traversing an intermediate node
is denoted by parameter d > 0. We assume that lij ≤ T for
all (i, j) ∈ E; otherwise, such link is worthless and can be
removed from G.
The set of all paths in G between i ∈ N and j ∈ N (with
i < j and (i, j) /∈ E) with length not greater than T is denoted
by Pij . Each path p ∈ Pij is defined by the binary parameters
βpk , indicating whether node k (which can be an end node)
is in p or not, and αpkt indicating whether link (k, t), k < t
is in p or not. So, Pij is composed by all paths p such that
n−1∑
k=1
n∑
t=k+1
αpktlkt + d
( n∑
k=1
βpk − 2
) ≤ T .
A. Path-based MILP model
For each node i ∈ N , we consider a binary variable vi
indicating whether i is a critical node or not. For each node
pair (i, j), with i, j ∈ N : i < j, the binary variable uij is 1
if nodes i and j are connected through a path satisfying the
transparent reach T, and 0 otherwise.
Then, for a given number c ∈ N of critical nodes, a path
formulation for the CND problem is given by the following
ILP model.
min z :=
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
uij (1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
vi ≤ c, (2)
uij + vi + vj ≥ 1, (i, j) ∈ E, (3)
uij +
n∑
k=1
βpkvk ≥ 1, (i, j) /∈ E, p ∈ Pij , (4)
vi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N, (5)
uij ∈ {0, 1
}
, i, j ∈ N : i < j. (6)
The objective (1) is to minimize z defined as the total number
of connected node pairs in the surviving graph (i.e. the graph
given by removing all critical nodes from G). Constraint (2)
ensures that at most c nodes are selected as critical nodes (in
any optimal solution, c nodes are selected). Constraints (3)
guarantee that a pair of adjacent nodes is connected if none
of the two nodes is a critical node. Constraints (4) are the
generalization of constraints (3) for the node pairs that are not
adjacent in G: node pair (i, j) is connected if there is one
path p ∈ Pij such that none of its nodes is a critical node.
Constraints (5)-(6) are the variable domain constraints.
Note that, since variables vi are binary, constrains (3)–(4)
impose uij ≥ 1 when nodes i and j are connected, which
then, due to the objective function, forces uij = 1. Therefore,
constraints (6) can be replaced by uij ≥ 0. The resulting
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model will be
considered henceforward.
B. Row generation approach
The exact number of constraints (4) of the MILP model
depends on the graph topology, the link lengths and the values
of T and d. However, the model becomes too large for relative
small sized instances. Here, we propose a row generation
approach to solve it. The exact algorithm is described in
Algorithm 1.
Initially, inequalities (4) are ignored and the relaxed MILP
problem is solved. Then, the separation problem associated
with inequalities (4) is solved, all violated inequalities are
added to the model and the MILP is solved again. The process
is repeated until no violated inequality is found.
The separation problem associated with constraints (4) is
solved in the following way. We determine a subgraph GC
removing from G the critical nodes and the corresponding
incident edges (GC = (N \C,EC)) and adding d to the length
of each edge in EC . Note that the number of intermediate
nodes of a path is equal to the number of edges minus one.
As a consequence, the shortest path value in GC is equal to
the path length plus d. So, we determine the shortest path in
GC between all pairs of nodes i and j in N \ C, such that
(i, j) /∈ EC , using Dijkstra algorithm, and each shortest path
whose length is not higher than T + d is used to generate a
new inequality (4) that is added to the model.
Algorithm 1 Exact algorithm for the CND problem
1: Solve the MILP model without constraints (4); let (u∗, v∗)
be the optimal solution
2: repeat
3: Set NCuts ← 0 and C ← {i ∈ N : v∗i = 1}
4: Compute subgraph GC = (N \ C,EC) where EC =
{(i, j) ∈ E : i, j /∈ C}
5: for all node pair (i, j) /∈ EC with i < j do
6: Run Dijkstra algorithm (adding d to the length of
each edge) to find the shortest path pij ∈Pij and its
length dij
7: if dij ≤ T + d and u∗ij +
∑n
k=1 β
pij
k v
∗
k = 0 then
8: Add constraint (4) corresponding to path pij
9: NCuts ← NCuts +1
10: end if
11: end for
12: if NCuts > 0 then
13: Solve MILP model with the added constraints. Up-
date (u∗, v∗)
14: end if
15: until Ncuts = 0
C. Centrality based heuristics
Heuristic methods based on centrality measures can be used
to compute critical node sets because they run very quickly
although not providing optimal solutions.
Algorithm 2 presents a general heuristic framework for
using these measures: in each iteration of the For cycle, a node
is selected according to the centrality measure chosen (steps 3
and 4) and removed from the graph (step 5). These heuristics
will be used later on in the network design task as a means
to shorten the evaluation runtime of solutions. Preliminary
tests have shown that these heuristics are worthwhile with the
following centrality measures:
• Degree centrality. The central node in step 3 is the node
with highest degree in the current graph G′.
• Betweenness centrality. In the current graph G′, the
betweenness of node i is the number of shortest paths
(adding d for each intermediate node) between all nodes
with length not greater than T that include node i as an
intermediate node. The central node in step 3 is the node
with highest betweenness.
Algorithm 2 Iterative heuristic based on a centrality measure
1: Set C ← ∅ and G′ ← (N,E)
2: for all k = 1 to c do
3: Select the central node i ∈ N of graph G′
4: Set C ← C ∪ {i}
5: Remove from G′ node i and all its incident edges
6: end for
D. Local search approach
Note that, for a given set of nodes C ⊂ N with |C| = c,
we can compute in polynomial time its CND value z by
determining the total number of shortest paths with length
not higher than T between all node pairs in the surviving
graph (i.e., the graph that results from G by removing the
set of nodes C and corresponding incident edges). So, in
order to potentially improve the solutions obtained with the
previous heuristics, we also consider a node based local search
method (described in Algorithm 3) that evaluates each swap
of a critical node by a non-critical neighbour node in G.
Algorithm 3 Local Search Method
1: Given a critical node set C ⊂ N with |C| = c and its
CND value z
2: repeat
3: for all i∈C, j∈N\C : (min(i, j),max(i, j)) ∈ E do
4: Cji ← (C\{i})∪{j} and compute its CND value zji
5: end for
6: if min{zji } < z then
7: Update z ← min{zji }, and C ← Cji accordantly
8: end if
9: until z is not updated
III. NETWORK DESIGN PROBLEM
In this section, we propose a multi-start greedy randomized
algorithm to generate network topologies, with a fibre length
budget given by B, that are resilient to critical node failures.
In the proposed algorithm, the evaluation of each network
topology uses the methods described in the previous section.
In general, a greedy randomized algorithm builds a network
topology by starting with a graph with an empty set of fibre
links G = (N, ∅) and randomly selecting one link at a time
until no new link can be added within the given budget B.
A key issue of this approach is how to define the probability
P
(
(i, j)
)
of each new link (i, j), with i < j, being selected so
that the method can efficiently find good network topologies.
After testing multiple strategies, the best results were obtained
by guaranteeing that at least one end node of each new link is
one of the lowest degree nodes of the current partial topology
and by giving an higher probability to shorter links.
After fine-tuning, the best algorithm was obtained consid-
ering the probabilities as follows. First, consider that at each
step the set of already selected links is E, δi is the degree
of node i in G = (N,E) and the remaining budget is BR =
B−∑(i,j)∈E lij . Then, for all node pairs (i, j) /∈ E such that
lij ≤ BR and at least one of the nodes (i or j) has the lowest
degree in G = (N,E) (i.e., min{δi, δj} = min{δk : k ∈ N}),
the probability is:
P
(
(i, j)
)
=
1
(|δi − δj |+ 1) lij2
(7)
while for all other node pairs (i, j), P
(
(i, j)
)
= 0.
Nevertheless, starting from an empty set of fibre links still
did not allow to reach an efficient algorithm. Instead, we have
investigated different criteria to adopt an initial non-empty set
E0 of fibre links. The most efficient algorithm was obtained
by using the Relative Neighbourhood Graph (RNG) [19] as
E0 which is defined as follows: nodes i, j ∈ N are connected
by a link if and only if there is no other node k ∈ N\{i, j}
such that lik ≤ lij and ljk ≤ lij . Our preliminary tests have
shown that this graph provides a good initial balance between
connectivity and amount of used fibre.
The resulting algorithm is described in Algorithm 4. Note
that this algorithm can be easily adapted to the upgrade of an
existing network topology by setting E0 in step 1 with the
link set of the existing topology instead of using the RNG.
Algorithm 4 Greedy Randomized Generation
1: Compute initial graph G = (N,E0)
2: Set BR ← B −
∑
(i,j)∈E lij
3: repeat
4: Select a new link (i, j) with probabilities given by (7)
5: E ← E ∪ {(i, j)}
6: BR ← BR − lij
7: until P
(
(i, j)
)
= 0, for all i, j ∈ N : i < j
Multiple runs of Algorithm 4 generate different topologies.
So, in a multi-start greedy randomized algorithm, we run
multiple times Algorithm 4, evaluate the CND value z of each
generated topology and store the topology with the highest z
among all. The resulting algorithm is presented in Algorithm 5
with a stopping criteria given by maximum runtime.
Depending on the purpose of the algorithm, the initial
topology G¯ = (N, E¯) is set differently in step 1. When the
algorithm is used to upgrade an existing topology, the initial
topology is set to G¯ = (N, ∅) with its CND value z¯ = 0.
When the algorithm is used to generate a topology better than
a given one defined by a graph G and with a CND value z,
then, G¯ is set to G and its CND value z¯ is set to z.
Recall that in the design of transparent optical networks, a
topology is only valid if it is optically transparent, i.e., if the
shortest path (adding d for each intermediate node) between
each node pair is not higher than T for all node pairs. So, each
topology generated in step 3 is first validated in step 4 and
discarded before evaluation if it is not optically transparent.
Moreover, when the initial topology G¯ is 2-connected, we
also require the solution of the algorithm to be 2-connected
and discard the topologies accordingly. In the context of
transparent optical networks, a topology is 2-connected if it
is optically transparent for every removal of a single node.
In steps 5-19, each valid topology is evaluated saving as best
topology the solution with the highest CND value z¯. Note that
the most time consuming part of Algorithm 5 is the evaluation.
The rationale of this algorithm is to use the heuristics described
in the previous section to evaluate each generated topology
and discard it whenever its objective value is lower than the
current best solution z¯. As a consequence, the exact method
to detect the critical nodes only runs if none of the heuristics
discard the topology under evaluation. Moreover, they are run
from the fastest (Degree centrality), in terms of runtime, to
the most time consuming (Exact CND method).
Algorithm 5 Multi-Start Greedy Randomized Algorithm
1: Initialize G¯ = (N, E¯) and its CND value z¯
2: repeat
3: Generate a new graph G = (N,E) using Algorithm 4.
4: if G is a valid topology then
5: Run Algorithm 2, using Degree centrality
6: Compute CND value zDeg from that node set
7: if zDeg ≥ z¯ then
8: Run Algorithm 2, using Betweenness centrality
9: Compute CND value zBet from that node set
10: if zBet ≥ z¯ then
11: Run Algorithm 3, using node set corresponding
to min{zDeg, zBet}, and compute zLS
12: if zLS ≥ z¯ then
13: Run Algorithm 1, obtaining zMILP
14: if zMILP ≥ z¯ then
15: G¯← G and z¯ ← zMILP
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
20: end if
21: until maximum runtime reached
IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
All computational results were obtained using the optimiza-
tion software Gurobi Optimizer version 7.5.1, with program-
ming language Julia version 0.6.0, running on a PC with an
Intel Core i7, 2.3 GHz and 6 GB RAM. Following [22], we
have assumed a transparent reach T = 2000 km corresponding
to the use of OTU-4 lightpaths with a demand capacity of 100
Gbps. Moreover, we have considered d = 60 km.
The network topologies selected in our computational ex-
periments are all optically transparent for T = 2000 km and
are: Germany50 [20], PalmettoNet [21] and Missouri Network
Alliance (MissouriNA) [21]. Table I presents their topology
characteristics in terms of number of nodes |N | and fibre
links |E|, total number of node pairs, minimum (δmin), average
(δ¯) and maximum (δmax) node degree and an indication (in
column ’2-C’) if the topology is (or is not) 2-connected.
Table I: Topology characteristics of each network.
Network |N | |E| Pairs δmin δ¯ δmax 2-C
Germany50 50 88 1225 2 3.52 5 Yes
PalmettoNet 45 64 990 1 2.84 5 No
MissouriNA 64 80 2016 1 2.50 5 No
In all cases, the geographical location of nodes is publicly
available but the geographical routes of fibre links is not
known. So, we have considered that each link follows the
shortest path over the surface of a sphere representing Earth.
Table II presents the resulting length characteristics in terms
of minimum (lmin), average (l¯), maximum (lmax) and total
(L) link length, and diameter, i.e., the highest length among
the shortest paths (adding d for each intermediate node) of
all node pairs (all topologies are optically transparent for T =
2000 km since all diameter values are below 2000).
Table II: Length characteristics (in km) of each network.
Network lmin l¯ lmax L Diameter
Germany50 26 100.7 252 8859 1417
PalmettoNet 19 67.0 177 4286 1298
MissouriNA 7 50.0 307 4001 1301
In the computational experiments, we have considered c ∈
{2, 3, 4, 5, 6} as the number of critical nodes used to compute
the resiliency metric z of each topology. For each network
and each c, we started by computing (with Algorithm 5) a
topology with a fibre budget B equal to the total fibre length
L of the original topology. Then, we computed an upgraded
topology for each original topology assuming a fibre budget
L′ = p× L with p = 10% and 20%. Finally, we computed a
topology with a fibre budget B = L+p×L also for p = 10%
and 20%. In each case, we gave a runtime limit of 5 hours to
Algorithm 5.
Table III presents the resiliency value z of the best topolo-
gies obtained by the multi-start greedy randomized algorithm.
Rows ’Original’ refer to the original topologies (in column
’0%’) and upgraded topologies (in columns ’10%’ and ’20%’)
while rows ’Generated’ refer to the best topology solutions
with a fibre budget B = L + p × L with p = 0%, 10% and
20%. For each case, columns ’UB’ presents the trivial upper
bound of z given by the number of pairs of |N | − c surviving
nodes.
The first observation of these results is that the resiliency
values are lower for higher number of critical nodes c, which
is without surprise since more node failures disrupt an higher
percentage of the network. Moreover, the resilience of the
upgraded topologies is always significantly better for higher
budget value L′. Finally, the best topologies are always
significantly better than the original/upgraded ones for Pal-
mettoNet and MissouriNA. Nevertheless, this is not the case
for Germany50 where the difference between the two types
of solutions is already small for higher values of c and even
null for many cases of the lower values of c. So, one major
conclusion is that Germany50 is significantly more resilient to
critical node failures than PalmettoNet and MissouriNA. To
understand this fact, recall from the topology characteristics
of the different networks (Table I) that Germany50 is the
topology with the highest average node degree and the only
one which is 2-connected. These two characteristics make this
network more resilient than the two other networks.
More important then analysing the absolute resiliency values
z, we need to analyse the resiliency gap between the origi-
nal/upgraded topologies and the best topologies computed with
the same fibre budget values. Figure 1 plots in a bar chart these
gaps, for all networks and all values of c, computed as zB−zO/UzB
where zB is the resiliency value of the best topology and zO/U
is the resiliency value of the original/upgraded topology. Blue
bars present the resiliency gap between the best topology and
the original topology. The resiliency gaps between the best
topologies and the upgraded topologies are presented in the
purple and green bars for p = 10% and 20%, respectively.
Figure 1: Resiliency gaps zB−zO/UzB (%) of all cases.
The blue bars of Figure 1 show that the resiliency gaps
are lower for Germany50 (but still significant for a number
of critical nodes c ≥ 3) and very large for PalmettoNet and
MissouriNA. These results reinforce the previous conclusion
that Germany50 is more resilient than the others but also show
that, in all cases, existing network topologies are not resilient
to critical node failures. On the other hand, the resiliency gaps
shown in the purple bars (corresponding to topology designs
with 10% more total fibre length) represent, in all cases, a
significant gap reduction when compared with the blue bars.
This means that in all topologies and for all considered number
of critical nodes, adding new links to an existing topology with
a fibre budget of 10% enables solutions whose resiliency to
Table III: Resiliency value z of all cases obtained by the multi-start greedy randomized algorithm.
c
Network Germany50 PalmettoNet MissouriNA
Instance 0% 10% 20% UB 0% 10% 20% UB 0% 10% 20% UB
2
Original 1036 1081 1128
1128
513 821 861
903
946 1555 1659
1891Generated 1128 1128 1128 861 861 861 1714 1714 1771
3
Original 711 991 1035
1081
346 616 709
861
602 1362 1446
1830Generated 991 991 1035 676 709 744 1495 1500 1550
4
Original 640 830 906
1035
284 427 510
820
455 762 1039
1770Generated 867 906 906 510 582 582 1126 1194 1311
5
Original 496 640 756
990
176 325 380
780
338 618 758
1711Generated 666 756 790 379 409 480 841 917 1081
6
Original 415 498 606
946
123 235 286
741
253 457 550
1653Generated 543 606 658 266 322 358 694 717 784
critical node failures becomes closer to a topology designed to
maximize this resilience. Interestingly, the results of the green
bars (corresponding to topology designs with 20% more total
fibre length) are mixed, i.e., in some cases, the additional 10%
fibre budget enables a significant gap reduction while in other
cases, the reduction is negligible.
Finally, we can distinguish two groups of results. For a
number of critical nodes c ≤ 3, the additional fibre budget
of 20% makes in all networks the resiliency gap to become
very small. For a number of critical nodes c ≥ 4, and in
the less resilient PalmettoNet and MissouriNA networks, the
additional fibre budget of 20% is still not enough to make
the resiliency gap small. This means that more fibre links are
required in the upgrade of existing networks to reach the best
resiliency to higher number of critical nodes.
Table IV presents, for each tested instance, the percentage
of the total fibre length L of the original topology that is
common to the best topology computed with the same fibre
budget L. These results show that these percentage values are
around 50%, with some small differences, for all topologies
and all values of c, showing that the best topologies, in terms of
resiliency to multiple node failures, are significantly different
from the existing ones.
Table IV: Percentage of the total fibre length of the original
topology common to the best topology.
c Germany50 PalmettoNet MissouriNA
2 43,6% 52,6% 47,1%
3 49,1% 52,1% 50,2%
4 45,8% 52,7% 49,5%
5 43,5% 51,1% 47,1%
6 46,3% 51,3% 48,0%
Average 45,7% 52,0% 48,4%
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 presents the original
topologies and the best topologies with the same fibre budget
L obtained for c = 3 critical nodes. To understand the
differences, links of the best topology not in the original
topology are highlighted in dashed blue and, in both cases,
critical nodes are represented with red squares. Also, Figure 3
presents the best upgraded solutions with L′ = 10%L and
20%L obtained also for c = 3 with the additional links
highlighted in dashed blue (again, critical nodes represented
with red squares). The analysis of these topologies show that:
Germany50: The critical node set splits the original network
in two components (10 and 37 nodes each) while it only
isolates two nodes from the others in the best topology.
Moreover, the critical node set isolates 2 nodes from the others
in the 10% upgraded topology and a single node in the 20%
upgraded topology.
PalmettoNet: The critical node set splits the original network
in three components (6, 13 and 23 nodes each) while it splits
the best topology in only two components (5 and 37 nodes
each). Moreover, the critical node set splits the 10% upgraded
topology in two components (7 and 35 nodes) and the 20%
upgraded topology in two components (4 and 38 nodes). In this
case, both the best topology and the two upgraded topologies
are 2-connected.
MissouriNA: The critical node set splits the original network
in three components (17, 20 and 24 nodes each) while it splits
the best topology in three components (1, 5 and 55 nodes
each). Moreover, the critical node set splits the 10% upgraded
topology in two components (9 and 52 nodes) and the 20%
upgraded topology in two components (6 and 55 nodes). In this
case, the 20% upgraded topology is 2-connected but neither
the best topology nor the 10% upgraded topology are, showing
that the original MissouriNA is much less connected and,
therefore, requires more fibre length upgrades to become 2-
connected.
This analysis clearly highlights that the best topologies with
the same total fibre of existing ones are much more resilient to
critical node failures and the resiliency of existing topologies
can be improved with the addition of new links.
Another aspect of interest is the comparison of the node
degree distributions between the original topologies and the
best topologies with the same total fibre. Figure 4 shows these
distributions for the three network cases with the best topolo-
gies obtained for c = 3 critical nodes (original topologies
in black and best topologies in blue). Interestingly, in the best
topologies, there is a decrease of the number of nodes with the
lowest and highest degrees and an increase of the number of
nodes with degrees closer to the average. This observation also
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MissouriNA MissouriNA
Figure 2: Original topologies (left) and best topologies (right)
for c = 3. Links not in the original topology highlighted in
dashed blue in the best topology (critical nodes in red squares).
stands in the best topologies for the other values of c showing
that resilient topologies tend to have more homogeneous node
degrees.
Figure 4: Node degree histograms of original topology (in
black) and the best topology (in blue) for c = 3.
Finally, recall that Algorithm 5 (see Section III) uses
heuristics in the evaluation of the CND value z of each valid
topology as a means to minimize the number of times the
exact method is used. In order to evaluate the efficiency of
this strategy, Table V presents the average percentage of valid
solutions that were discarded by the heuristics, row ’Success
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Figure 3: Best upgraded topologies with L′ = 10%L (left) and
20%L (right) for c = 3. Links added to the original topologies
highlighted in dashed blue (critical nodes in red squares).
(%)’, and the average runtime percentage the algorithm has
spent while running the heuristics, row ’Success (%)’, among
all cases of each network topology and also among all cases
of all topologies (column ’Average’).
Table V: Average percentage of discarded solutions and aver-
age runtime percentage of the heuristics running Algorithm 5.
Germany50 PalmettoNet MissouriNA Average
Success (%) 36.8 71.8 65.0 57.9
Time (%) 19.2 57.7 51.0 42.6
The results of Table V show that both percentage values
vary significantly between the different network topologies.
Nevertheless, in all cases, the percentage of discarded solutions
is always higher than the percentage of runtime spent by
the heuristics. In the overall, almost 60% of the solutions
were discarded at the cost of 42,6% of computational effort,
showing that indeed the use of heuristics has improved the
overall computational efficiency of the proposed multi-start
greedy randomized algorithm.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have addressed the topology design of
transparent optical networks aiming to maximize their re-
silience against critical node failures. We have proposed a
multi-start greedy randomized algorithm resorting to a MILP
based method, using row generation, to compute the critical
nodes of each topology. The algorithm can be used both in the
design of network topologies and in the upgrade of existing
topologies.
We have run the proposed algorithm on three network
topologies with publicly available information comparing the
resiliency gap between the existing/upgraded topologies with
the best topologies designed to maximize its resilience with
the same fibre budget.
The results have shown that the resiliency gap of existing
topologies is significantly large but network upgrades with
L′ = 10%L can already reduce significantly the resiliency
gaps provided that such upgrades are aimed at maximizing
the network resiliency to multiple node failures.
Finally, comparing the best topologies with the existing
ones, the best topologies are characterised by a decrease of
the number of nodes with the lowest and highest degrees
and an increase of the number of nodes with degrees closer
to the average node degree. This clearly shows that network
topologies resilient to critical node failures tend to have more
homogeneous degrees among all their nodes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work is based upon work from COST Action CA15127
(”Resilient communication services protecting end-user appli-
cations from disaster-based failures – RECODIS”) supported
by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technol-
ogy). First author was supported by FCT (“Fundac¸a˜o para a
Cieˆncia e a Tecnologia”), Portugal, through PhD grant with
reference SFRH/BD/132650/2017. Second author was sup-
ported by FCT through project UID/EEA/50008/2013. Third
author was supported by FCT through CIDMA within project
UID/MAT/04106/2013.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Rak, et al. RECODIS: Resilient communication services protecting
end-user applications from disaster-based failures. in proc. ICTON,
We.D1.4., 2016.
[2] T. Gomes, et al. A survey of strategies for communication networks to
protect against large-scale natural disasters. in proc. RNDM, 11–22,
2016.
[3] M. Furdek, et al. An overview of security challenges in communication
networks. in proc. RNDM, 43–50, 2016.
[4] F. Barbosa, A. de Sousa, A. Agra. The Design of Transparent Optical
Networks Minimizing the Impact of Critical Nodes. Electronic Notes in
Discrete Mathematics, vol. 64, 165–174, 2018.
[5] A. Agra, A. de Sousa, M. Doostmohammadi. The Minimum Cost Design
of Transparent Optical Networks Combining Grooming, Routing, and
Wavelength Assignment. IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, vol. 24, no.
6, 3702–3713, 2016.
[6] A. Arulselvan, C. W. Commander, L. Elefteriadou, P. M. Pardalos.
Detecting Critical Nodes in Sparse Graphs, Computers & Operations
Research, vol. 36, 2193–2200, 2009.
[7] A. Veremyev, V. Boginski, E. Pasiliao. Exact Identification of Critical
Nodes in Sparse Networks via New Compact Formulations. Optimization
Letters, vol. 8, 1245—1259, 2014.
[8] D. Santos, A. de Sousa, P. Monteiro. Compact Models for Critical Node
Detection in Telecommunication Networks. Electronic Notes in Discrete
Mathematics, vol. 64, 325–334, 2018.
[9] M. Di Summa, A. Grosso, M. Locatelli. Branch and cut algorithms for
detecting critical nodes in undirected graphs. Comput. Optim. Appl.,
vol. 53, no. 3, 649–680, 2012.
[10] A. Veremyev, O. Prokopyev, E. Pasiliao. Critical nodes for distance-
based connectivity and related problems in graphs. Networks, vol. 66,
no. 3, 170-–195, 2015.
[11] D.F. Rueda, E. Calle, J.L. Marzo. Robustness Comparison of 15 Real
Telecommunication Networks: Structural and Centrality Measurements.
J. of Network and Systems Management, vol. 25, no. 2, 269–289, 2017.
[12] S. Neumayer, G. Zussman, R. Cohen, E. Modiano. Assessing the
Vulnerability of the Fiber Infrastructure to Disasters. IEEE/ACM Trans.
on Networking, vol. 19, no. 6, 1610–1623, Dec. 2011.
[13] A. Zeng, W. Liu. Enhancing network robustness against malicious
attacks. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys, vol. 85, no. 6, Pt
2, 2012.
[14] A. Beygelzimer, G. Grinstein, R. Linsker, I. Rish. Improving network
robustness by edge modification. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and
its Applications, vol. 357, no. 34, 593–612, 2005.
[15] C. Natalino, A. Yayimli, L. Wosinska, M. Furdek. Link addition frame-
work for optical CDNs robust to targeted link cut attacks. in proc.
RNDM, 1–7, 2017.
[16] F. Dikbiyik, M. Tornatore, B. Mukherjee. Minimizing the Risk From
Disaster Failures in Optical Backbone Networks. OSA Journal of
Lightwave Technology, vol. 32, no. 18, 3175–3183, 2014.
[17] K.A. Sabeh, M. Tornatore, F. Dikbiyik. Progressive network recovery in
optical core networks. in proc. RNDM, 106–111, 2015.
[18] A. de Sousa, D. Mehta, D. Santos. The Robust Node Selection Problem
aiming to Minimize the Connectivity Impact of any Set of p Node
Failures. in proc. DRCN, Munich, 138–145, 2017.
[19] G.T. Toussaint. The relative neighbourhood graph of a finite planar set.
Pattern Recognition, vol. 12, no. 4, 261–268, 1980.
[20] S. Orlowski, R. Wessaly, M. Pioro, A. Tomaszewski. SNDlib 1.0 —
Survivable Network Design Library. Networks, 55(3), 276–286, 2010.
[21] S. Knight, H.X. Nguyen, N. Falkner, R. Bowden and M. Roughan. The
Internet Topology Zoo. IEEE J. on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 29, no. 9, 1765–1775, October 2013.
[22] F. Rambach et al. A multilayer cost model for metro/core networks.
IEEE/OSA J. Optical Communications and Networking, vol. 5, no. 3,
210—225, March 2013.
